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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
By LAWRENCE SPEISER
"The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States."'
That sentence certainly seems simple enough. However, that little sen-
tence has probably caused more difficulty for the United States Supreme Court
than any other group of words in the whole Constitution. Some judges and
lawyers have considered it to be an exclusive grant to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, i. e., it is also a restriction on state power. John Marshall
in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden enunciated the idea that the Federal Commerce
power is plenary, and "that a state may regulate commerce . . . among the
states, cannot be admitted."
Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the commerce clause has developed not only
to afford Congress more and more power under the commerce clause, but
also to limit and qualify state regulation of interstate commerce. These
seemingly paradoxical developments have as their common basis the desire
on the part of the court to curtail its own power of judicial review in favor
of the political agencies of the government in the country.2
However, it is just a development and nothing more. The states, in the
exercise of their own powers, notably the taxing power, have constantly run
into the maxim that they shall not regulate commerce. Since the states need
more subjects of taxation to defray the increased costs of government, the
trend has been to allow the states more and more freedom in the exercise
of their taxing power. This is more understandable since the first purpose of
the commerce clause, the creation of a unified nation, has long since been
achieved.3 Thus instead of a hard dividing line limiting a state's power to
tax in the light of Congress' oft stated plenary control' of interstate com-
merce, there has been a steadily shifting line, which has varied with the
historical situation, and allowed the states more freedom in the exercise of
their taxing power affecting commerce. This does not mean that all the
barriers are down. The purpose of this article is to determine just what are
the present limits of a state's power to tax interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has used and discarded many tests in determining
whether to uphold or to strike down a state tax. The court has been criticized
'Article I, section 8, U. S. Constitution.
'Corwin: The Constitution and What It Means Today, page 44.
'35 Georg. L. J. 517.
"'The power of Congress over interstate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
"That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state
power." Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U. S. 334.
(20)
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by many writers5 for using legalistic theory or formulae as the basis for its
decisions, rather than using a pragmatic test based on whether the tax actually
does interpose a real trade barrier between the states or does place an
economic burden on interstate commerce. The pragmatist would look to the
ultimate effect of the test rather than to the manner in which the tax is imposed
or to the legalistic form in which it is cast. The court has continued to use
legalistic formulae, with various members of the court backing their own
particular favorites, so it is incumbent on us to examine their various tests.
Tests, Formulae, and Criteria
DIRECTNESS OF BURDEN-Traditionally, state taxes which burden inter-
state commerce directly have been held invalid,6 and those which have only
an "indirect" effect on interstate commerce have been upheld.7 This doctrine
is founded on the "plenary" interstate commerce power vested in Con-
gress, i. e.:
"the Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact
laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States,
but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the
States. In short, the Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation
by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States."
A legalistic anomaly has appeared in the application of this rule, how-
ever. It has been consistently held since 1872 that any state tax on gross
receipts derived from interstate commerce was an undue burden on that
commerce and thus forbidden by the Constitution.' If the tax is levied on
some other subject matter and is merely measured by gross receipts derived
from interstate commerce, the tax is valid.1" In spite of pronouncements like
those of Justice Holmes that "The distinction between a tax equal to one per
cent of gross receipts and a tax of one per cent of the same, seems to us
nothing,"'" the court has continued to rely on this presumed distinction and
to hold taxes measured by gross receipts valid, While it nullifies taxes on gross
receipts from interstate commerce. The state legislatures simply have to shout
the magic words, "Open, Sesame!" (only in this case "measured by") and
'Brown: State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-What Now? 48 Mich. L. R. 899; 33 Va. L. R.
351; 46 Mich. L. R. 50.
'New Jersey Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes (1930), 280 U. S. 338.
"American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis (1919), 220 U. S. 459.
'See Freeman v. Hewitt (1946), 329 U. S. 249, where Justice Frankfurter in his decision
expresses almost the same thoughts that Justice Marshall had in Gibbons v. Ogden on Congress'
plenary power over interstate commerce. However, it is highly doubtful whether Justices Marshall
and Frankfurter would see eye to eye on just what is the size of "the area of trade" that should be
free from interference by the states.
'Rule of the State Tax, 15 Wall 232.
"0U. S. Express Co. v.lMinn. (1912), 223 U. S. 335.
1210 U. S. 217 (1908).
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they open to themselves the treasurehouse of gross receipts from interstate
commerce.
12
There is probably a great deal of validity to the direct burden criterion,
if not applied too rigidly, since a direct burden is more likely to be injurious
and objectionable than an indirect burden." A tax on gross receipts derived
from interstate commerce is presumptively bad (ignoring for the moment
the distinction between "on" and "measured by"), since a business has to pay
the tax even if it runs at a loss. There is far more chance of its constituting
an actual burden than a tax on net income derived from interstate commerce,
which the courts have upheld.14
The difficulty with the direct burden test is that the line between direct
and indirect is not a very definite one and, in truth, is just a matter of degree.
However, if the line is capable of being drawn, a small direct tax may be
in fact a greater burden than a heavy tax which only indirectly impinges on
interstate commerce. 1 5
LOCAL INCIDENT-It has been argued that if a state is allowed to tax
a local incident of interstate commerce such as delivery,' 6 or manufac-
turing,1" or use,"8 there can be no discrimination against, or multiple burden
upon interstate commerce. Obviously no other state can tax delivery but the
state in which delivery is made; no state can tax manufacturing but the state
in which the manufacturing takes place; no state can tax use but the state in
which an article is used. If another state did attempt to levy such taxes, it
would run afoul of the due process clause in trying to tax an operation outside
its territorial boundaries.
This theory has been behind the imposition of use taxes by the state
of the buyer of goods moving in interstate commerce. The state of the seller
has usually not been allowed to tax an interstate sale, but in order to compen-
sate for the taxes on intrastate sales, states are allowed to impose taxes on
the local use of articles of interstate commerce. Otherwise local producers
would be at a competitive disadvantage. 9
"See Pullman Co. v. Richardson (1923), 261 U. S. 330, where a tax on "property," or American
Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis (1919), 250 U. S. 459, where a tax on "manufacturing" measured by gross
receipts, were only considered to have a remote or indirect effect on interstate commerce.
48 Mich. L. R. 899.
"Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler (1942), 315 U. S. 649. Of course the net income tax must be
apportioned so as not to burden activities outside the taxing state, but this is a due process con-
sideration rather than a commerce clause restriction. See Hans Rees' Sons v. N. Carolina (1931),
283 U. S. 123.
"Indiana Warehouses Inc. v. Schiele, 331 U. S. 70.
"McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. (1940), 309 U. S. 22.
"American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis (1919), 250 U. S. 459.
"Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. (1937), 300 U. S. 577.
"Ibid., at page 581.
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The difficulty with this theory is that interstate commerce is composed
of a great many separate incidents, as was pointed out by Justice Rutledge in
Nippert v. Richmond,20 and the cumulative effect of taxes on each incident
might be very great.
A few of these local incident cases have been explained on the ground
that the "local incident" is actually not part of commerce at all. Chief Justice
Hughes, in his dissent in the Berwind-White case in which the court upheld
a New York state tax on the delivery of coal produced in Pennsylvania, but
delivered in New York, stated:
"Mr. Justice Cardozo in speaking for the Court in the Henneford case
was most careful to show that the use tax was upheld because it was imposed
after interstate commerce had come to an end."
In the same case he also said:
"It is urged that there is a taxable event within the state. That event is
said to be the delivery of the coal. But how can that event be deemed to
be taxable by the State? The delivery is but the necessary performance of
the contract of the sale. Like the shipment from the mines, it is an integral
part of the interstate transaction." 21
Although Hughes' point of view had been discarded for some time,
Freeman v. Hewitt,2" decided in 1946, made its reappearance a distinct
possibility. Freeman v. Hewitt, itself, was decided on the direct burden
criteria, however.
DiscImrNATioN-A tax that discriminates against interstate commerce
is invalid.2" A discriminatory tax is one falling only on interstate commerce
but not in intrastate commerce. Thus in Best v. Maxwell24 a North Carolina
tax on the use of hotel rooms for display of goods was held invalid since it
was only imposed on out-of-state merchants and specifically exempted resi-
dent retail merchants. The court considered this a flagrant discrimination
against such out-of-state salesmen and the goods which they carried into the
state through interstate commerce channels. Undoubtedly a substantial trade
barrier between states would be raised if discriminatory taxes were ever
allowed. Everyone would buy goods which were produced locally because
they would be cheaper than goods which came into a state through interstate
channels, with a tax added to their sales price.
Justice Black has consistently pointed out this danger.25 He feels that
20327 U. S. 416 (1947).
21309 U. S. 33 (1940).
22329 U. S. 249 (1946).
"5Darnell & Son v. Memphis (1908), 208 U. S. 113; see Pacific Co. v. Johnson (1932), 285 U. S.
480.
2"311 U. S. 454 (1940).
"Dissent-J. D. Adams kfg. Co. v. Storen (1938), 304 U. S. 307.
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the court should not invalidate any state tax, no matter how extreme and
burdensome
"unless it actually discriminates against interstate commerce, or conflicts with
a regulation enacted by Congress. Congress alone must determine how far
interstate commerce . . . shall be free and untrammelled, how far it shall
be burdened by duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited. ' 26
Note that not only does Justice Black use discrimination as the sole
criterion for the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce, but also that
he means actual discrimination and not merely threatened or potential
discrimination. It was for that reason in Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford
that he dissented from the majority opinion which held unconstitutional a
Washington tax on those desiring to do business in the fruit industry, such
a tax being a tax on the gross income of the total business. Justice Black felt
that since no other state had imposed a similar tax on this particular appel-
lant, the appellant had sustained no injury which would justify overcoming
the presumption of constitutionality of the Washington tax statute.
Whether or not there has been discrimination has been considered too
narrow a test by other judges, and it has been held that the mere lack of actual
discrimination against interstate commerce will not lend validity to an unduly
burdensome tax.27
MULTIPLE OR CUMULATIVE BURDEN-Justice Stone in 1938 in West-
ern Livestock Co. v. Bureau of Revenue,2" announced a rule permitting state
taxes on gross receipts from interstate commerce if they were either
(1) apportioned, or (2) incapable of being duplicated by any other state.
His rule was that the threat of exposure to a cumulative tax burden because
of a tax on the same subject by other states rendered a gross receipts tax
imposed by the seller's state invalid.29 This gives recognition to the idea
that "even interstate business must pay its own way by bearing its share of
local tax burdens,"3 but it need not bear cumulative tax burdens that would
place it at a competitive disadvantage with intrastate commerce.
'8 Dissent-Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford (1939), 305 U. S. 434.
27Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission (1937), 302 U. S. 90; Freeman v.
Hewitt (1946), 329 U. S. 249.
28303 U. S. 250.
"Justice Black maintains his position that discrimination should be the sole criterion for the
courts, and opposes a rule of self apportionment:
"It has been suggested that Indiana might by law apportion to itself that part of a tax on gross
receipts from interstate commerce to which it is entitled. Such an apportionment by Indiana would
fix the portion of such a tax for the other forty-seven states, which appellant interstate business
might touch. Indiana has no authority to determine what, how, when, or to what extent other states
may tax within their respective boundaries. If such power of apportionment or allocation exists at
all, it must be true that the only repository of a power touching complex and national aspects of
interstate commerce is not Indiana, not the Judiciary, but the National Congress." Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen (1938), 304 U. S. 377.
"5 Postal Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259.
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In Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,"3 decided in 1939, Justice
Stone expressed his views in this manner:
"Under the commerce clause, in the absence of Congressional action,
state taxation, whatever its form, is precluded if it discriminates against inter-
state commerce or undertakes to lay a privilege tax measured by gross receipts
derived from activities in such commerce which extend beyond the territorial
limits of the taxing state.3 2 Such a tax at least when not apportioned to the
activities carried on within the state . . . burdens the commerce in the same
manner and to the same extent as if the exaction were for the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce and would, if sustained, expose it to multiple
tax burdens, each measured by the entire amount of the commerce to which
local commerce is not subject. . . . Such a multiplication of state taxes, each
measured by the volume of the commerce, would reestablish the barriers to
interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause to remove."
This test seems to have the closest identification with a pragmatic test,
i. e., whether there is an actual burden on interstate commerce. Indeed, in a
footnote in the Berwind-White case, Justice Stone admits:
"Despite mechanical or artificial distinctions sometimes taken between
the taxes deemed permissible and those condemned, the decisions appear to
be predicated on a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being
used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage."
There was a certain difficulty though in applying the cumulative burden
test to tax cases involving interstate sales. A sales tax on an interstate sale
is in effect a gross receipts tax on interstate commerce. But, while the state
of the seller can administer an apportioned gross receipts tax without great
difficulty, it is virtually impossible to apportion a sales tax. To require
the buyer's state to apportion a sales tax almost amounts to a prohibition
of any tax since the seller may not maintain a place of business within the
taxing state, and the buyer's state would then have no means of collecting
the tax. In that case it would give a competitive advantage to interstate
commerce. On the other hand, to allow a sales tax on the full proceeds of
an interstate sale would appear to permit multiple taxation, at least to the
extent that the other states touched by the commerce attempt to exact any
type of levy, apportioned or unapportioned. 3 The use tax has been developed
to avoid legal objections to a sales tax. It is imposed on the state of the user
and has been upheld as being imposed on a local incident of commerce.
However, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in McCleod v. Dilworth,84
"The economic effect of a use tax and a sales tax on interstate commerce is
exactly the same."
81305 U. S. 434.
"Note that there would be infringement of due process here also.
"56 Yale L. J. 898.
"'322 U. S. 327 (1944).
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS-State taxation of interstate commerce must
pass the scrutiny of the court to determine if it imposes a prohibitive burden
on interstate commerce. In this connection, it should be noted that state
taxation is scrutinized much more closely than state regulation of interstate
commerce. Justice Frankfurter, in Freeman v. Hewitt, stated:
"A police regulation of local aspects of interstate commerce is a power
often essential to a state in safeguarding vital local interests. . . .State
taxation falling on interstate commerce, on the other hand, can only be
justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost
of the local government whose protection it enjoys. But revenue serves as
well no matter what its source. To deny to a state a particular source of
income because it taxes the very process of interstate commerce does not
impose a crippling limitation on a state's ability to carry on its local function.
"Moreover, the burden on interstate commerce involved in a direct tax
upon it is inherently greater, certainly less uncertain in its consequences, than
results from the usual police regulations. The power to tax is a dominant
power over commerce. Because the greater or more threatening burden of a
direct tax on commerce is coupled with the lesser need to a state of a partic-
ular source of revenue, attempts at such taxation have always been more
carefully scrutinized and more consistently resisted than police power regula-
tions of aspects of such commerce."
Obviously the application of a state gross receipts tax to those businesses
which are wholly engaged in interstate commerce, such as railroads, is more
likely to be held an invalid interference with such commerce.35 However,
it is easier to apportion taxes on such businesses, basing the apportionment
on the total mileage within the state as compared to the mileage without.
In the case of a nontransportation business, apportionment of the tax is
difficult and often impossible.36
Recent Cases
From 1938 to 1946 the Supreme Court appeared to use Justice's Stone's
cumulative burden test wherever possible. Indeed, it seemed as if the
Supreme Court were approaching the stage where it would eliminate legal-
istic formulae and use a pragmatic test on which to base its decisions.
However, in 1946 the case of Freeman v. Hewitt was decided. In that
case an Indiana gross receipts tax was held invalid as applied to the sale
of stock by an Indiana resident on the New York Stock Exchange. Justice
Frankfurter, in his majority opinion, went back to 1925 and resurrected the
direct burden test. This was not done by oversight as the following excerpt
clearly shows:
"5Fargo v. Mich. (1887), 121 U. S. 230.
"Lockhart: Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Commerce (1943), 57 H. L. R. 40.
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"But that, for the time being, only one state has taxed is irrelevant to
the kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The
immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power
of a state can hadly be made to depend in the world of practical affairs, on the
shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various states at a particular
moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so delicate
as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic
setting which, as to an isolated application of a state tax, might mitigate the
obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on commerce. Nor is there
any warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore applied by this Court
to support the notion that a state may be allowed one single-tax-worth of
direct interference with the free flow of commerce. An exaction by a state
from interstate commerce falls not because of a proven increase in the cost of
the product. What makes the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference
by a state with the freedom of interstate commerce."
This quotation, by inference, discards all the tests developed by preced-
ing cases for determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce.
It discards apportionment, local incident, multiple burden, and discrimina-
tion, and resurrects the direct burden formula.
In 1947, an excise tax levied by the City of New York on the gross
receipts of a stevedoring company engaged wholly within the territorial limits
of the city in loading and unloading vessels moving in interstate and foreign
commerce was held invalid in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.87
Here it was expressly noted there was no danger of multiple taxation but still
the Court declared the tax invalid because, "Stevedoring . . . is essentially
a part of interstate commerce itself . . . and therefore a tax on its gross
receipts is involved." Probably the consideration that the taxpayer was an
agency of interstate transportation was determinative.
In 1948 the Supreme Court, in Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,
which involved a New York gross receipts tax, held "Interstate Commerce
is unconstitutionally burdened by a state tax upon carriers' gross receipts
from such transportation; but the state may constitutionally tax such part of
the receipts as is proportioned to the mileage traversed within the state."
Here the taxpayer was engaged in the transportation of passengers between
two cities in New York, but over 40 per cent of the mileage of the route was
out of the state. By this decision, New York could only tax that percentage
of the gross receipts which the mileage traveled in the state bore to the total
mileage traveled.
Also in 1948, in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone'8 the Supreme Court allowed
Mississippi to impose a property tax on the amount of pipe line and the com-
pressors within the state boundaries even though the petitioner's business was
'330 U. S. 422.
1'335 U. S. 80.
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exclusively interstate, transporting gas from Louisiana to Tennessee. The
court said:
"This is a tax on activities for which the State, not the United States,
gives protection and the State is entitled to reasonable compensation when its
tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate
business."
Conclusions
On the basis of these recent cases, what conclusions can be drawn as
to the constitutionality of a state tax or interstate commerce?
1. Where there is an actual cumulative tax burden, a state tax on gross
receipts derived from interstate commerce will be held invalid. Such a tax
would be invalid under the direct burden test as well as all the other tests
and would impose a discriminatory economic burden on interstate commerce.
2. If the court does not choose to rely on the possibility of double
taxation, then the old test of direct or indirect burden may be used (as it
was in Freeman v. Hewitt, supra).
3. In the case of carriers and transportation businesses, an apportioned
gross receipts tax will be upheld. (Central Greyhound, Memphis Gas Co.,
supra.) An unapportioned gross receipts tax on an agency of interstate trans-
portation will evidently fall even though duplication is impossible. (Joseph v.
Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., supra.)
4. Gross receipt taxes in the form of sales taxes or use taxes imposed
by the state of a buyer will be considered valid, even though they are levied
on articles which have moved in interstate commerce. Otherwise, producers
for interstate commerce would be given an advantage over local producers.
5. An unapportioned gross receipts tax imposed by a seller state is
considered invalid as applied to receipts from interstate commerce. In most
situations it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the seller's state to
apportion a tax on gross receipts of sales in interstate commerce.
6. Even though there is no discrimination, e. g., a tax is imposed on
intrastate as well as interstate commerce, that is not sufficient to save the tax
if it is considered to impose a direct burden on interstate commerce.
